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ABSTRACT  
 
Fertility and per capita income are now positively associated across most 
high income OECD countries. Low fertility and a gender wage gap persist in 
Japan. This paper presents an original model where endogenous increases in 
childcare prices and gender equity in capital allocation play important roles 
in the effect of per capita income growth and rising female relative wages on 
fertility. Results suggest Japan has cause for optimism. Economic growth will 
raise female relative wages where capital is equitably allocated in the 
workforce. In turn, rising female relative wages will sustain a fertility rebound 
where childcare productivity is sufficiently high. 
Keywords: fertility; economic growth; gender wage gap; endogenous child‐care    
JEL Classification: J13; J24; 040 
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I Introduction 
At 1.39 births per woman, Japan's total fertility rate in 2010 remains among the 
lowest in the developed world. If current trends continue, Japan's population is 
expected to shrink by one third in 50 years (United Nations, 2011). However, these 
projections are not a foregone conclusion. They are especially sensitive to 
assumptions about the future course of fertility (United Nations, 2011). 
Interest in the question of whether fertility will rebound in Japan is sparked by the 
fact that we are currently witnessing a fundamental change in the relationship 
between fertility and economic development. On the basis of cross-sectional and 
longitudinal data covering more than 100 countries, Myrskyla et al (2009) find that 
the well established negative relationship between fertility and development now 
resembles a J at advanced stages of development. In 2005, as countries progress to 
Human Development Index (HDI) levels exceeding 0.91, the HDI-fertility association 
reverses to a positive relationship.
                                                          
1The HDI is an index, primarily used by the United Nations to evaluate development, which 
combines with equal weight indicators of a country's health conditions, standard of living 
and human capital. For most OECD economies, HDI levels exceed 0.9, which corresponds to 
75 years life expectancy, per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) US$25,000 in year 2000 
PPP and a 0.95 human capital index (based on literacy and enrolment rates). 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows the reversal in fertility decline for a sample of developed 
economies where total fertility rates are climbing back to replacement - the level 
at which enough children are born to replace their parents. This reversal in trend is 
pervasive across high income OECD countries and raises two questions. First, is the 
fertility rebound likely to be sustained? Second, why has low fertility persisted in 
some countries, such as Japan? These questions have relevance and importance 
for the debate on ageing population and associated immigration and pro-natalist 
policies. 
HDI does not reveal information on how its components of per capita GDP, 
education and longevity interrelate or aspects of development which benefit 
women rather than men. The objective of this paper is to re-examine the 
theoretical relationship between fertility, female wages relative to male wages and 
per capita GDP in light of recent evidence and, in doing so, shed light on the 
prospect of a fertility rebound in Japan. 
Galor and Weil (1996) show that female wages rise relative to male wages with per 
capita GDP because men and women are endowed with different labour. The rising 
opportunity cost of maternal time induces fertility decline since only time is used 
to rear children. Apps and Rees (2004), Day (2004) and Martinez and Iza (2004) 
show that rising female relative wages may induce a rise in fertility if households 
can substitute child care for maternal time. However, the price of child care is fixed 
in these models. This is a shortcoming when assessing whether a fertility rebound 
is likely to persist, since increased demand may raise the price of child care. 
In contrast to the existing literature, this paper analyses whether a positive impact 
of female relative wages on fertility can be sustained as rising demand for children 
puts pressure on child care prices to rise and whether female relative wages 
necessarily rise with per capita GDP. Whether a fertility rise can be sustained rests 
on the relative rise in child care prices. Why Japan, with high per capita GDP, is yet 
to experience a fertility rebound may depend on whether growth in per capita GDP 
filters through to higher female relative wages. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to model the effect of rising 
female relative wages on fertility with endogenous increases in the price of child 
care and to link rising female relative wages to gender differences in not only 
labour endowments but also capital allocations in the workforce. These extensions 
enable us to assess both the robustness of an emerging positive relationship 
between fertility and per capita GDP witnessed in most OECD economies and the 
persistence of low fertility in Japan. 
Two particularly interesting results of the model presented in this paper are, firstly, 
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that fertility of households purchasing child care rises with female relative wages 
despite endogenous increases in child care prices, however, a positive relationship 
between overall fertility and female relative wages is not robust. Secondly, 
economic growth may not raise female relative wages if, relative to women, men 
work with increasing capital. These results have a wide range of implications for 
the role of gender equity, child care policy and the use of current fertility 
trajectories in formulating population projections. 
Section II reports on some empirical facts concerning total fertility rates, per capita 
GDP and the gender wage gap in OECD countries and reviews related models of 
endogenous fertility in light of these facts. Section III provides a theoretical 
framework capable of analysing the effect of female relative wages on fertility, 
with an endogenously determined market price of child-care. Section IV relates the 
results of the theoretical modelling to recent trends in Japanese female relative 
wages and discusses why a gender wage gap may persist, despite growth in per 
capita GDP. 
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II Facts and Review of Related Models 
Endogenous fertility models explain growth in per capita GDP as a cause and 
consequence of household choice of fertility. This section singles out the 
association between per capita GDP and fertility, which provides a useful platform 
for developing a theoretical model. Endogenous fertility models recognise that the 
opportunity cost of maternal time influences household fertility choice. This 
section therefore also examines the role of gender wages. 
[Figure 2 and 3 about here] 
Observation 1 The once strictly negative cross-country association between fertility 
and per capita GDP has become positive for most OECD economies with high levels 
of per capita GDP. 
Figures 2 and 3 depict the once strictly negative and emerging positive cross 
country correlation between fertility and per capita GDP, respectively. The 
correlation suggests the emergence of a relationship that is convex across all OECD 
economies and positive for most OECD economies with high per capita GDP. Of 
course, we would need to control for cross country heterogeneity. Luci and 
Thevenon (2010) do this and confirm a convex impact of per capita income on 
fertility, for OECD economies, after controlling for birth postponement and country 
specific effects.2 Some outliers are worth mentioning. Higher fertility in the United 
States and New Zealand is partly due to Hispanic populations, religious and ethnic 
diversity, and Maori populations, respectively (McDonald, 2009). 
Referring to Figure 3, Japan and Germany have much lower fertility than France, 
Australia and Finland despite having similar living standards. Figure 4 suggests a 
possible explanation as to why Japan may be at the bottom rather than the top of 
the steep positive association between fertility and per capita GDP. In Japan, 
female wages are roughly one third of male wages, almost twice the OECD average 
gender wage gap of 17.6 per cent. This gives us 
Observation 2 OECD economies with the highest gender wage gap (lowest female 
relative wages) have the lowest fertility. 
Existing models of endogenous fertility predict that economic growth induces 
fertility decline, by raising either female relative wages, and hence the opportunity 
cost of maternal time, (Barro and Becker, 1989; Galor and Weil, 1996), the relative 
return to investing in education per child (Becker et al., 1990; Ehrlich and Lui, 
1991; Galor and Weil, 2000; de la Croix and Doepke, 2003; Lee and Mason, 2010) 
                                                          
2Although timing and policy effects do not explain the positive association, developing the 
model in this paper along the lines of Guest and Parr (2010) is a feasible direction for future 
research. 
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or the fraction of skilled workers, who have fewer children than their unskilled 
counterparts (Dahan and Tsiddon, 1998; Kremer and Chen, 2002; Kimura and Yasui, 
2007; Sato et al, 2008, Chen, 2010). 
In the main, endogenous fertility models predict an unambiguously negative 
interrelationship between per capita GDP and fertility for high income economies. 
However, Apps and Rees (2004) and Day (2004) extend Galor and Weil (1996) to 
show that fertility may rise with female wages and female relative wages, 
respectively, if there is sufficient substitutability in rearing children between 
maternal time and child-care services. Intuitively, substitution to child care enables 
households to mitigate the rising opportunity cost of unpaid maternal time, which 
underpins fertility decline. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
By normalising the price of child care to 1, both models implicitly fix the relative 
price of child care. A fixed price of child care is in fact an assumption common to 
models where child care is a substitute for maternal time (Martinez and Iza, 2004; 
Hirazawa and Yakita, 2009). Martinez and Iza (2004) incorporate a child care sector, 
thereby endogenising the price of child care. However, their assumption that child 
care uses unskilled labour yields a constant price of child care. 
Yasuoka and Miyake (2010) introduce Martinez and Iza's (2004) child care market 
to the model of de la Croix and Doepke (2003), where households choose the 
number and education level of children. Since labour is skilled, the price of child 
care rises proportional to the average level of education. The assumption that 
households do not comprise men and women yields tractable analysis. However, 
like per capita income, average education levels in the low fertility countries, such 
as Japan and Korea, are similar to those in the higher fertility OECD countries.3 
Observation 2 suggests that a model be developed along the lines of Galor and 
Weil (1996) where the gender wage gap plays a role in fertility choice. Overlooked 
in the existing literature is the effect of female relative wages on fertility under 
endogenous child care prices. 
This paper further extends the literature by considering herein that the price of 
child care is given by equilibrium in the market for child care services which 
employs skilled female labour. We find Martinez and Iza's (2004) model of the 
child care sector to be a useful starting point for the analysis in this paper, which 
focuses on whether a positive relationship between fertility and female relative 
                                                          
3For example, average years of schooling of the population aged 15-64 in 2010 is 13.25, 
13.34 and 13.11, 13.34 in Japan, Korea and Australia, UK, respectively (Cohen and Soto, 
2007). 
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wages can be sustained as rising demand for child care puts pressure on child care 
prices to rise. 
In the following section, like Martinez and Iza (2004) we assume that market 
provided child care and maternal time are perfect substitutes and take the division 
of labour exogenously. In Section IV, like Galor and Weil (1996), we explain why 
female wages are lower than male wages, which gives the division of labour. 
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III The Model 
Consider an economy where agents supply labour, consume and use either 
maternal time or purchased child care to rear children. Our basic unit of analysis is 
the couple and they are assumed to be together from birth, as in Galor and Weil 
(1996). The household, headed by a man and a woman with joint consumption and 
utility, decides how many children to have and whether to rear children using 
maternal time or purchased child care. 
 
(i) Household optimisation 
Each agent (household) derives utility directly from the number of children. The 
household utility function is  
( ) cnu ln1ln γγ −+=    (1) 
Where c  and n denote household consumption and pairs of children, 
respectively; )1,0(∈γ  captures the relative preference for children. 
Each man and woman is endowed with a unit of time. Men allocate their unit time 
endowment to the paid labour force. To raise a pair of children, women may 
employ a fraction of their time endowment, )1,0(ˆ∈z , in which case their paid 
labour supply is ( )nẑ1− . Alternatively, women may buy out their unpaid time in 
child-rearing for a child care fee, P , thereby raising their paid labour supply to  
1 . 
The budget constraint of a household not purchasing child care is 
( ) fmf wwcnzwm +=−+− τ1ˆ)1(      (2) 
Where m is the rate of maternity pay and consumption is taxed at the rate of τ . 
Alternatively, the household may pay a fee of P , subsidised at the rate β , to 
use child care services. Specifically, if )1(ˆ)1( β−≥− Pzwm f the household 
budget constraint changes to 
( ) fm wwcnP +=−+− τβ 1)1(      (3) 
Each household chooses n  and c  to maximise (1) subject to (2) or (3), yielding  
( )  )1(ˆ)1( if 
ˆ)1(
βγ −<−
−
+
= Pzwm
zwm
wwn ff
fm
x
   (4a) 
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( ) )1(ˆ)1( if 
)1(
β
β
γ
−≥−
−
+
= Pzwm
P
wwn f
fm
y    (4b) 
and ( )τα −+= 1/)( fmi wwc  where yxi ,=  denotes a household using 
maternal time or buying child care, respectively. 
Remark 1 As male and female wages rise, with female wages rising relative to 
male wages, fertility of a household using maternal time and child care, declines 
and rises, respectively, for a given price of child care. 
From (4),  
[ ]
[ ] 0
)(
lnlnln
0lnln
)(
ln
,
>
+
+
=
<−
+
=
fm
ffmm
P
y
fm
fm
m
m
x
ww
wdwwdwnd
wdwd
ww
wnd
β
   
The intuitive explanation for the differential fertility response lies in a comparison 
of substitution and income effects. When both husband and wife work, female 
wages constitute a portion of household income. When maternal time is the 
child-rearing input, the cost of child-rearing rises proportionate to female wages. 
As female relative wages rise, the substitution effect dominates the income effect 
and fertility declines. When purchased child care is the child-rearing input, rising 
female relative wages has a pure income effect, for a given price of child care, and 
fertility rises. 
By implication, the average fertility, which includes households who purchase child 
care, may increase as female relative wages rise. Thus far the effect of rising 
female relative wages on fertility has been analysed for a given price of child care 
services. This paper explores the robustness of a positive relationship between 
fertility and female relative wages, and so the price of child care is endogenised in 
a straightforward manner by assuming that child care is produced using a portion 
of the female labour force and sold at a price is determined by market demand 
and supply. 
 
(ii) Production of Final Output and Child Care 
The production of final goods is given by  
),,( my
f
y LLKAY =     (5) 
where physical or human capital which augments labour ( )K , female labour 
employed in the final goods sector ( )fyL  and male labour ( )
m
yL  are factors of 
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production, all with non-increasing marginal products and  A   is a parameter 
that affects total factor productivity in final goods. Labour is complementary to 
capital. 
Perfectly competitive factor markets imply  
[ ]kkgkgAw jy )()( ′−=      (6) 
where LKk /≡  denotes capital per household and mfj ,=  . 
The nexus between rising female relative wage and economic growth is discussed 
in Section IV. For the moment, note that female wages are lower than male wages. 
Specifically,  
)()( kwkw my
f
y <       (7) 
Whereas men work in the final goods sector, women may work in child care 
services or final goods sectors. 
The production of aggregate child care services is given by 
x
fLX ρ=     (8) 
where fxL  is female labour employed in child care and ρ  is a parameter that 
affects total productivity and also captures quality improvements in the child care 
sector. The child care sector profit is fx
f
x
f
x LwLP −= ρπ . Under perfect 
competition, we obtain x
f
x Pw ρ=  . 
 
(iii) Child Care Market 
The aggregate supply of child-care services is   
    ( )[ ]xfx nzNL ˆ1−= ϕρρ      
where N  is the aggregate number of households and ϕ  is the fraction of 
households with women working in child care. 
If fy
f
x ww >  then the woman works in the child care services sector. Alternatively, 
if fy
f
x ww <  then the woman works in the final goods sector. Capital augmented 
labour moves between the two sectors so as to equate wages: fy
f
x ww =  or  
)~(kwP ft =ρ , where k
~
 is the level of capital per household where female 
labour is employed in both child care and final goods production. 
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The aggregate demand for child care services is 
( )N
P
wwNn
fm
yy ϕ
β
γ
−
−
+
= 1
)1(
)(
     
where yN  is the number of households with women working in the final goods 
sector. If <− )1( βP zkwm f ˆ)()1( −  then the household uses child care services. 
Alternatively, if >− )1( βP zkwm f ˆ)()1( −  then the household uses maternal 
time to rear children. Let k

 denote the level of capital per household where the 
economy comprises both households using maternal time and buying child care: 
=− )1( βP zkwm f ˆ)()1(

− . 
If we assume )1/()1(ˆ mz =−= βρ , for simplicity4, then we obtain kk

=
~
 and 
the economy will comprise households of two types, described herein. The 
economy is populated by women who work in the final goods sector and use child 
care, and women who work in child care services and use their own time to rear 
children. 
(iv) Equilibrium 
The market price of child care services is determined so that demand coincides 
with supply, yielding 
( ) fm
fm
wwm
mwwP
/)1(
)1)((1
1
1)1(
γγ
γ
ργ
γ
ϕ
ϕβ
−−−
−+
−



 −
=−    (9) 
where ( )kw j  . 
P changes in response to market demand and supply forces, to satisfy (9). On the 
one hand, market demand for child care increases in the income, and fraction of 
households with women working in final production, )( fm ww +  and ( )ϕ−1  , 
respectively, and the preference weight for children, γ . On the other hand, 
market supply of child care increases in the fraction of households with women 
working in child care, ϕ , productivity in the sector, ρ , and labour supply to the 
sector, which increases in mf ww / , since higher female relative wages reduces 
fertility of women working in child care, freeing up time for paid work. In 
equilibrium, the sectoral allocation of labour stabilises and, ceteris paribus, P   
                                                          
4As in Yasuoka and Miyake (2010), this assumption excludes two additional household 
types: one where women work in the goods sector and do not purchase child care, the 
other where women work in child care and purchase child care. 
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increases with rising ( )kwm  and ( )kw f  . 
Remark 2 Fertility of a household using child care rises with female relative wages, 
for an endogenously increasing price of child-care. 
From (4b) and (9), 
( ) ( ) 0)1(1/ <−−
−
=
∂
∂
mww
n
fm
y
ϕ
ϕργ
     (10) 
where ϕ  is constant in equilibrium. 
The intuitive explanation for a rise in fertility of households purchasing child care 
as female relative wages rise lies in the market influences on the price of child care. 
From (9), if female relative wages ( )mf ww /  rise, then the equilibrium price of 
child care rises proportionately less than household income )( fm ww + . Demand 
for child care shifts out with rising household income. Supply of child care also 
shifts out with rising female relative wages, because of the reduced fertility and 
increased labour supply of child care workers. An increase in )( fm ww +  has a 
positive income effect on the demand for fertility of households purchasing child 
care. This flows through to the market for child care, driving up the price. A rise in  
( )mf ww /  has a positive substitution effect on the supply of labour for women 
working in child care. With this supply effect, the rise in the child care price will be 
proportionately less than the rise in household income and the fertility of 
households purchasing child care rises. 
Remark 3 Overall fertility in the economy rises with female relative wages if 
productivity in the child care sector is sufficiently high. 
The overall fertility of the economy is a weighted average of the fertility of 
households using child care and maternal time. From (4a) and (4b), overall fertility 
rises with female relative wages for a sufficiently high ρ  : 
( ) ( ) zzmww
f
fm ˆ
1 iff 0
ˆ
1
1/
><




 −
−
=
∂
∂ ρργϕ     
Intuitively, the fertility of women working in child care and final goods sectors falls 
and rises, respectively, as female relative wages rise. Whether overall fertility rises 
or falls depends on the relative weight attached to differential fertility responses. 
A relatively high ρ  implies a relatively lower price of child care, giving a higher 
weight to the fertility rise of households working in the final goods sector. 
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IV Female Relative Wages 
Cigno and Rosati (1996) show that the decline in fertility up until 1990 
corresponded to a steady rise in the female-male wage ratio in the United States, 
United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. Since 1990, female wages have continued to 
rise relative to male wages in most OECD economies (ILO, 2010). In Japan, female 
relative wages rose until recently. Between 1989 and 1999, Japan's female-male 
wage ratio rose from 56 per cent to 66 per cent (Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare, 2010). However, Figure 5 reveals that, since 1999, female hourly wages 
have grown broadly in line with male hourly wages. 
If female relative wages are constant, then the results of the analysis in this paper 
indicate that neither fertility of households using child care, nor overall fertility in 
the economy will rise, under endogenously determined child care prices. These 
findings are consistent with the bottoming out of fertility in Japan. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Endogenous fertility models have various mechanisms which link rising female 
relative wages to economic growth. Galor and Weil (1996), Doepke et al (2007) 
and Greenwood et al (2005) attribute differential productivity in the labour market 
to innate differences between men and women. Ex-ante gender differences 
explain why only women devote time to unpaid work, such as child rearing. Most 
widely used is the Galor and Weil (1996) assumption that men are endowed with 
skilled labour and physical labour (brains and brawn), whereas women are 
endowed only with brains. As physical capital accumulates, the marginal product 
of skilled labour rises and female wages rise proportionately more than do male 
wages. Economic growth causes female relative wages to rise. However, this is at 
odds with the following 
Observation 3 Despite economic growth, Japanese female relative wages have 
remained relatively constant over the last decade. 
Why then does a gender wage gap persist in Japan? Women and men may be 
similarly endowed in terms of skilled labour when they graduate and, consistent 
with Galor and Weil (1996), jobs requiring brute force are most likely male 
dominated, but do skilled men and women work with the same capital in the 
workforce? How capital is allocated between men and women may hold the key to 
the persistence of a gender wage gap. 
To see this, consider a production technology with separability, first used by Galor 
and Weil (1996) to capture the relative rise in rewards to female labour brought 
about by economic growth. The production function is given by 
( )( )us bLLKAY += −αα 1      (11) 
where K , sL  and uL  denote capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour, 
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respectively. Men are endowed with one unit of skilled labour and one unit of 
unskilled labour. Women are allocated with one unit of skilled labour, which is 
allocated between child rearing and labour force participation. 
Perfectly competitive labour markets imply  
α
α 





−
−=
z
kAwsf 1
)1(      (12a) 
αα kAwsm )1( −=      (12b) 
Abwum =      (12c) 
where k  is capital per household and z  is total maternal time spent rearing 
children. The assumption that men and women are endowed with equal amounts 
of skilled labour, while only men are endowed with unskilled labour, yields two 
predictions. First, there is a gender wage gap: sf
u
m
s
m www >+ . Second, economic 
growth closes the gender wage gap. Over time, both male and female wages grow 
with capital accumulation, however, male wages grow proportionately less:  






−
+−=
+ −αα
α
k
A
bz
w
ww
s
f
u
m
s
m
)1(
1)1(    (13) 
where ( ) 0/ <∂∂ + ks
f
u
m
s
m
w
ww  . 
An implicit assumption underlying (13) is that men and women work with the same 
capital per household. Consider the case where men and women work with 
different amounts of capital, mk  and fk . The gender wage gap is now  








−
+







−=
+ −α
α
α
α ff
m
s
f
u
m
s
m k
A
b
k
k
z
w
ww
)1(
)1(    (14) 
where ( ) 0/ <∂∂ + fw ww ksf umsm  and ( ) 0/ >∂∂ + mw ww ksf umsm . An increase in the ratio 
fm kk /  raises male relative wages, countering the negative effect of increasing 
fk . Thus, the effect of economic growth on the female relative wages is no longer 
unambiguously positive, yielding the following 
Remark 4 If men work with increasing capital relative to women, then capital 
accumulation need not close the gender wage gap. 
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Many Japanese firms have a lifetime employment system (LES) which may provide 
incentives for men to work with increasing capital relative to women. First, 
patriarchy is strongest in older generations, who remain in decision making 
positions. Second, investment in the human capital is confined to workers who put 
in long hours and who are likely to have uninterrupted careers. Third, because the 
LES avoids dismissal, firms adjust labour input by adjusting working hours. 
Overtime is therefore necessary under usual economic conditions. Married women 
may be unable to provide long working hours due to gender inequity in 
housework. 
As a consequence, to date, women may have found it difficult to reach positions 
where they can acquire high levels of capital and influence the allocation of capital. 
Referring to Figure 6, Japan and Korea are indeed clear OECD outliers in the 
portion of women in senior positions. Currently, in Japan, only 10 per cent of 
senior positions are held by women. There is room for more women at the top and, 
looking forward, reason to expect that women will break the glass ceiling. For 
instance, in 1990, 1 per cent of total parliamentary seats were held by women. By 
2010, this figure had risen to 11 per cent (World Bank, 2011). The number of 
women in positions of influence in Japan may be low relative to other high income 
OECD countries, but it has risen from a low base. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
Asia Pacific Economic Papers 
 
15 
 
Conclusion 
The once negative association between fertility and per capita income has become 
positive for OECD economies with high levels of per capita income. There are some 
noteable exceptions. Countries such as Japan and Korea, with the lowest female 
relative wages also have the lowest fertility. 
This paper analyses the effects of female relative wages on fertility in a model that 
incorporates a child care services market. In contrast to the existing literature, 
endogenous increases in the price of child care and gender equity in the allocation 
of capital play important roles in the effect of female relative wages on fertility and 
the effect of economic growth on female relative wages, respectively. The analysis 
predicts that: 
• As female relative wages rise, the equilibrium price of child care rises less than 
proportionate to household income. Consequently, fertility of households 
using child care rises. 
• Overall fertility, which includes households who use maternal time to rear 
children, may rise with female relative wages if productivity in the child care 
sector is sufficiently high. 
• Growth in per capita output may not filter through to higher female relative 
wages if men work with increasing capital relative to women. 
For an endogenously increasing price of child care, the fertility of households using 
child care and maternal time, rises and falls, respectively, with female relative 
wages. Overall fertility rises if the rise in fertility of households using child care 
dominates. This in turn depends on a relatively low cost, high productivity child 
care sector. 
The results in this paper suggest that the emerging positive association between 
fertility and per capita income is not robust. Firstly, economic growth may not 
filter through to rising female relative wages if capital is inequitably allocated in 
the workforce. Secondly, whether rising female relative wages can sustain a 
fertility upturn depends on the relative productivity of the child care sector. 
Some interesting implications arise. More equitable allocation of capital between 
male and female skilled workers may hold the key to a fertility upturn in Japan, 
where female relative wages have levelled off over the past decade. We may also 
expect a positive association between fertility and female relative wages to 
continue in countries with well established and productive child care sectors. 
There is cause for optimism about the future course of Japanese fertility. Japan has 
the vantage of being able to catch up with respect to the number of women in 
senior positions and to appreciate the importance of affordable child care in 
sustaining a fertility rebound. 
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Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate (births per woman)  
 
 
Figure 2: Total Fertility Rate (vertical) versus GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 
international $) (horizontal), OECD, 1980-1984 
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Figure 3: Total Fertility Rate (vertical) versus GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 
international $) (horizontal), OECD, 2005-2009 
 
 
Figure 4: Gender Wage Gap for 22 OECD economies, 2006 
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Figure 5: Japanese Female and Male Hourly Wages, 1999-2009 
 
 
Figure 6: Total Fertility Rate (LHS) versus Female Legislators, Senior Officials and 
Managers as a percent of total (RHS), OECD, 2007 
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